


US Weekly Prospects



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
United States

- **Incoming growth signals continue to strengthen**
- **Fed officials continue to sound hawkish, but haven't made a strong case for October so far**
- **The upcoming annual GDP revisions should raise non-labor income and the saving rate; trim core PCE**
- **Next week: 100k payrolls, 4.1% unemployment, 3.3% core PCE**

There was little new data this week, but what there was came in strong, further raising upside risks for 3Q growth and lifting bond yields. Over the course of the week, markets upped their probability of an October Fed hike to 64% from 53%, and the 10-year Treasury yield jumped another 16bp, to 5.16%. Last week we discussed some of the risks around whether the Fed would hike beyond our forecast for a December move, but the discussion is quickly turning to whether the Fed could hike as soon as October.

Next week's data calendar gets much more packed, with September employment, the annual GDP update, and a stack of August real activity measures, including August PCE, trade, and inventories. For the employment report, we look for a decent 100k increase in payrolls, and for the unemployment rate to hold at 4.1%. But we see a risk of a drop to 4.0% given low readings on continuing jobless claims. In the GDP and PCE reports, the most watched development will be the impact of core PCE deflator methodology updates. We think they will reduce the July over-year-ago core PCE rate by 15-20bp, and that a 0.25% m/m increase in August will then leave the over-year-ago rate at 3.3%, with a chance of rounding down to 3.2% (Figure 1). Whatever the exact number, it should continue to be perceived as firm by the Fed, despite the three-month rate likely falling to 2.7%.

Figure 1: Core PCE deflator, w/ projected revisions and Aug forecast




Yields surge with Fed pricing

Market pricing of policy rates across central banks rose sharply further this week, led by the Fed being repriced to

nearly 5% by next September, and remaining near that level into 2028 (Figure 2). This represents about a 75bp jump over the past month (i.e., just prior to Jackson Hole) and nearly 100bp above pricing prior to the June FOMC meeting. A flurry of Fed speakers this week supported additional tightening this year. While broadly in line with the latest dot plot, the tone skewed hawkish overall. New York Fed resident John Williams, who dovishly suggested that the trend in inflation was slowing before the September FOMC meeting, this week stated that “we still have a lot of work to do.” This assessment was broadly echoed in remarks by Governor Barr and both current (Hammack, Kashkari) and future (Goolsbee, Harkin, Paulson) voters among the regional bank presidents.

Figure 2: Market pricing of fed funds rate path



The repricing of the Fed has been an important factor in higher rates across the curve—and arguably the biggest contributor to rising yields this week. Stronger growth, AI debt issuance, and fiscal concerns also have imparted upward pressure. Mortgage rates are now about 7%, while risk assets have largely powered through the increase in yields thus far.

With the market now pricing a nearly two-thirds chance for the FOMC to hike again in October, we are sensitive to what might get the Fed to move at the next meeting. Given that Chair Warsh and some other Fed speakers have argued the labor market is broadly in balance, it likely would take more than one hot jobs report—and specifically signs of an upward trend in wages—to convince the Committee that the labor market is overheating. But a strong labor report in conjunction with strong September inflation data that point to another high-side 0.2% monthly core PCE reading (after accounting for a possible reversal in last month's spike in cell phone service prices) might be sufficient. That said, no one on the Committee has explicitly advocated for consecutive hikes, and we think a case may be made—as in July, per Warsh's press conference remarks—for the Committee to wait and observe how the data evolve and how markets handle the first rate hike.

Here comes the GDP revision

On September 30 the BEA will publish the third release of 2Q GDP and the August PCE report, which will include the [annual update](#) to the national income and product accounts (NIPAs). GDP and GDI will be revised back to 2021. The only methodology change is for the PCE deflators for software and accessories, portfolio management services, and legal services, which we've previously discussed [here](#) and [here](#). Among these updates, market participants appear to be most uncertain about the new process for the portfolio management deflator. Given past Fed concerns that it just reflects asset price movements, the BEA's decision to revise the methodology may have been perceived as an attempt to "fix" that issue. However, based on our reading of the annual update announcement, coupled with conversations with the BEA, it is our understanding that the deflator will continue to reflect those market moves. That is because the deflator should be calculated by dividing estimates of investment company revenue—which reflect asset prices—by a "CES-based quantity extrapolator," likely hours worked.


In terms of new source data, the annual update incorporates expenditure-side data for 2023 from the Census Bureau's annual surveys of retailers, wholesalers, other service firms, and manufacturers, whose separate surveys have now been rolled up under the new Annual Integrated Economic Survey (AIES). On the income side, IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) will be used for 2023, along with Computstat and FDIC data for 2025, which should lead to revisions for income receipts on assets, among other things. Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages data will also be used for 1Q26, and the seasonal pattern of wage growth from 2025 will be revised.

Revisions to historical GDP growth rates are often an academic curiosity, but revisions to the saving rate—from either spending or income—could be more interesting. The saving rate has been steadily falling, [calling into question](#) the sustainability of spending. But [the saving rate is often revised up](#), which may happen again this year, as it did last year.

Strong PMIs, upside 3Q risks

After a rough first half of the year, the all-industry PMI has rallied sharply in the third quarter, with the September output measure hitting 58.4, the highest since the post-COVID spike in 2021 (Figure 3). According to the press release, which uses a regression of GDP against the PMI level, this level of the PMI is consistent with around 5% GDP growth, with the 3Q average level consistent with 4% growth.


Figure 3: PMI all-industry output vs. real GDP growth



For next week's August core PCE report, we expect that real spending will grow over 0.6%*m/m*, which if realized could create further upside risk to our 3.5% 3Q GDP forecast. The key swing factor at this point in the quarter is trade and inventories. Given what had been decent but not spectacular readings on job growth and business surveys, we've been hesitant to assume that growth would be much stronger, even if final demand looked hot. The September PMIs do, though, provide one piece of evidence that growth could be firmer. Moreover, the strength in September coupled with what should be a good trajectory through the quarter raises upside risks for our 4Q forecast, which has growth cooling to 1.75%.

The other piece of the September PMI that stood out was the ongoing firmness in inflation signals. There was a spike in service input prices, and manufacturing supplier delivery times continued to grow (Figure 4). The press release noted that robust output gains were "being accompanied by some of the most severe supply chain bottlenecks seen in the near-two-decade survey history if the pandemic is excluded, with companies also reporting increasing problems finding suitable staff." The other PMI indexes for prices paid and received did not move as much but remain elevated. Moreover, the regional Fed surveys also point to rising inflationary concerns.


Figure 4: PMI services input prices, PMI mfg supplier delivery times



US Focus: Revisions to the saving rate

The saving rate has steadily drifted down over the last few years, leading to concerns that consumer spending could eventually slow. Soaring wealth is likely one reason for a saving rate decline, along with higher gas prices since March. But the saving rate also has a strong tendency to be [revised up](#), especially via positive income revisions (Figure 1), which if repeated would suggest recent spending growth is more durable. Receipts on assets were a key source of upward revision in last year's annual GDP (NIPA) update, and we see reasons why they could be revised higher again either in the [annual update](#) that is being released next week or in future updates. Also, while the magnitude of positive revisions shown in Figure 1 has shrunk over time, it is possible that future comprehensive updates could eventually raise this.

Figure 1: Revisions from first print in saving rate and its components




Next week's annual GDP update will revise GDP and GDI back to 2021. Wage income is the largest component of income, but because it is heavily based on the timely Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages it is usually not subject to major revisions—although quarterly seasonal factors will be updated. More relevant is the inclusion of IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) data for 2023, which influences retirement plan, dividend, interest, and proprietor income. Dividend and interest income for 2025 will also be updated with newly available source data from Compustat and the FDIC.

Income on assets has been relatively weak in recent years relative to related indicators, and so could be revised up over time. For NIPA dividends, growth has been running materially lower than S&P 500 dividends since 2024 (Figure 2). S&P total dividends tend to be more volatile than NIPA dividends, so in Figure 2 we give 25% weight to growth in total S&P 500 dividends and 75% weight to growth in common dividends only. This alternate S&P 500 dividend series has roughly similar cumulative growth to NIPA dividends since 1990. Had NIPA dividends grown at the same rate as this S&P 500 series since 2022, then the saving rate would currently be


2.3%-pt higher. We don't place too much weight on this exact figure given how often the two series diverge and the definitional differences between NIPA and S&P 500 dividends, but do think risks are tilted toward positive dividend revisions over time.

Figure 2: NIPA personal dividends vs. S&P 500 dividends



For personal interest income, its share of disposable personal income (DPI) has remained well below pre-COVID levels, despite a sharp uptick in interest rates since 2022 (Figure 3). Holding all else equal, were interest income to be revised higher so that its share of DPI returned to pre-COVID levels, then the saving rate would increase by 1.3%-pt. We view this more as a directional risk, however, than a reliable point forecast. Interest income was actually revised down in last year's annual update. Moreover, the 1980s experience demonstrates that it can take years for interest income to adjust to a new level of interest rates.

Figure 3: Personal interest income vs. interest rates




Looking further ahead, the current saving rate could also be revised up multiple times, including in the comprehensive GDP updates that occur every five years. It is challenging to say whether these revisions will become less meaningful over time: on the income side, the comprehensive updates typically involve new methodologies, as opposed to the routine incorporation of better data. Consequently, the BEA might eventually run out of improvements to make, in which case the smaller revisions of recent years could become the new normal.

Still, it's probably too early to conclude this. For example, while the saving rate from 2015 has to date been revised up less than a percentage point, the same could be said of data from 1970 for the first 25 years after publication, whereafter it was revised up another 5%-pt (Figure 4). Much of that upward revision didn't come until 2013, in part reflecting the re-calculation of defined benefit pension income under accrual accounting. That change in pension treatment is a one-off, as are changes like a 1999 re-classification of government retirement plans into personal income. Conversely, the 1985, 2009, and 2018 updates made adjustments for misreporting of income, especially for proprietors, and this may continue to be a future issue as tax laws evolve.

Figure 4: Change in saving rate since original publication date

Percent. The lines for each year show the first quarter of that year



Source: BEA, Philadelphia Fed, J.P. Morgan

US: The saving rate: not waving but drowning?

- Real consumption growth has held up despite weak aggregate income growth...
- ... leading to a steady decline in the personal savings rate
- By some estimates, surging household wealth could have accounted for most of this
- Higher energy prices should also cut the savings rate around 0.5%-pt between February and September...
- ... allowing for a bit of savings rebuild without lower real consumption if gas prices were to fall

When we describe the economy as “resilient,” we are really talking about the consumer. Yes, capital spending growth has been solid, but given roaring profit growth and record profit margins, it would be surprising if that category of spending growth wasn’t solid. However, real personal disposable income has only grown 1% annualized year-to-date. Despite this anemic income growth, real consumption growth has generally held in, growing above 2% and probably closer to 3.5% in the middle half of the year. The only way to make this math work is through a reduction in the personal saving rate.

This decline in the saving rate has met two interpretations. In the benign version, soaring household wealth—partly driven by AI enthusiasm in equity markets—has motivated a lower saving rate through the usual wealth effects. In the more concerning version, the only way consumers can keep spending through the latest jump in headline inflation is by borrowing or dipping into savings, perhaps in an unsustainable way.

In this note, we argue that much of the trend decline in the saving rate over the past few years is the normal wealth effect. This should be fine so long as there isn’t a major set-back in equity markets. However, the acceleration in the decline in the saving rate over the past six months is likely due to consumers maintaining spending habits despite a higher cost of living. This too could end up well, if energy prices return to near pre-war levels. But sustained high pump prices could eventually lead to a rebalancing of income away from consumption and back to saving.


Before diving in, also note that while the factors we mention here should affect savings, measurement challenges mean there is uncertainty regarding how much the savings rate has declined, and the rate has a [tendency to be revised higher over time](#). The next opportunity for revisions will be in next week’s annual GDP update. GDP comprehensive updates, the

next of which comes in 2028, also frequently introduce sizable revisions.

The glass half full


Household balance sheets continued to strengthen last quarter on the back of soaring equity holdings, with net worth as a percent of disposable personal income hitting a new all-time high (Figure 1). Net worth jumped \$13tr in 2Q alone, and is up \$21tr over the last four quarters. Updating an analysis we performed last year, we estimate that the increase in wealth over the last year had the potential to lower the saving rate by 0.6%-2.1%.

Figure 1: Household net worth to disposable personal income Ratio



Most of the large 2Q increase in household net worth reflected rising equity holdings. Based on the Federal Reserve’s Financial Accounts report, equity assets accounted for \$11tr of a \$13tr rise in total assets, while there was minimal growth in liabilities. Equity assets now account for 34% of total assets, up from 25% just before the pandemic (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Household asset mix




The AI boom continues to be a meaningful contributor to equity market growth. To measure the performance of AI-linked equities, we consider a basket of 30 companies assembled by our equity strategy team that have exposure to the AI trade, including major technology companies (JPRAID30 Index). That group accounted for 38% of the S&P 500 market cap at the end of 1Q, but contributed 56% of the S&P’s 2Q

gain. Still, over the longer run the significant role for AI in wealth gains is becoming more about the large starting weight of these companies in equity markets, as opposed to their routine outperformance. At the end of 2022, our AI basked accounted for 26% of the market capitalization of the S&P 500, rising to 42% by the end of 2024, but has since held in a fairly narrow range (Figure 3).

Figure 3: S&P 500 market cap and share of cap from AI companies

\$tr, year-end or most recent; column labels are AI % of total market cap




Source: S&P Global, J.P. Morgan

Not surprisingly, large gains in wealth, especially equities, accrue disproportionately to the upper end of the wealth spectrum. For example, over the last year, the wealth gains of the top 1% by wealth were more than 30x those of the bottom half (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Change in wealth, by household wealth percentile

4Q change in trillions of 2026 \$, deflated with headline PCE



Source: Federal Reserve Board, J.P. Morgan

From wealth to spending

In [prior work](#), we used a marginal propensity to consume out of wealth of 3.5%, based on the work of [Beach et al \(2025\)](#). More precisely, that coefficient maps the change in the ratio of net worth to disposable personal income into a change in the ratio of consumption to income. The \$21tr increase in net worth over the last year raised the ratio of net worth to DPI by about 0.6, implying an increase in the consumption/DPI ratio of $3.5\% \times 0.6 = 0.021$, and an equivalent 2.1%-pt drop in the savings rate. The actual savings rate has fallen 2.2% in the four quarters to 2Q26, almost the same amount. Per Figure 1, the net worth/DPI ratio has also risen materially since the pre-COVID period, and the same calculation would imply a drop in the saving rate of 4.4% since the end of 2019, simi-

lar to the realized drop of 4.0%.

It is plausible that the consumption boost from rising net worth is smaller than these estimates. The 3.5% MPC from Beach et al is based on a long sample using all forms of wealth. But the same work finds a moderation in the MPC in recent years, with an MPC of 2.6% over the last decade. That MPC would imply a drop in the saving rate of 1.5% over the last year and 3.3% since 2019.


Much of the most recent rise in net worth has also stemmed from equities, which could have a lower MPC than other forms of wealth, either because they are viewed as more volatile, or because they are disproportionately held by high-income / high-wealth individuals who have low MPCs. Beach et al estimate an MPC from equity wealth of just 1%, which would produce a 0.6% fall in the saving rate over the last year. They also provide an MPC estimate by income percentile: 0.8% for the top 20% of the income distribution and 7.5% for the bottom 80%. With much of the wealth over the last year accruing to upper income individuals, this would imply a drop in the saving rate of 1.1%.

Not all studies have equity wealth MPCs as low as those in Beach et al. [Maki and Palumbo \(2001\)](#) had found MPCs out of total wealth of roughly 3.5-5.0% in 1992-2000, a period when equities were contributing the most to wealth gains. [Chodorow-Reich, Nenov, and Simsek \(2021\)](#) is a more recent paper that finds an equity wealth MPC of 3.2%, estimated using cross-county differences in stock holdings and consumption.

The energy shock, and taxes

While there is uncertainty regarding how wealth translates into savings, the effect of energy prices is more clear cut. The most obvious channel is via higher gasoline costs, since households have a limited ability to adjust their real consumption of energy goods. The BEA's monthly spending data estimates that between February and July, nominal household spending on motor fuel and fuel oil rose 16%, a close to \$70bn annualized increase (Figure 5). That lowered the savings rate by 0.3%-pt. Since July, energy prices have been heading higher and are almost back to the May peak. If nominal fuel consumption returned to the May level, it would lower the saving rate another 0.2%-pt, or a cumulative reduction of 0.5%-pt since February.

Figure 5: Gas prices vs. motor fuel spending



If energy prices don't drop soon, households could start to economize more on energy, but could also choose to cut other consumption to rebuild savings. Conversely, if energy prices returned to pre-conflict levels, it would allow about half a percentage point increase in the savings rate without any off-setting reduction in other spending.


One final point on the savings rate decline this year is around the BEA's treatment of the OBBBA tax cuts. The BEA spreads the tax cut evenly across the year, but actual cash flows to households are more concentrated around the tax filing season in March and April. Since households are likely to bunch their related spending around the time of the cash flows, this lowers the savings rate into the middle part of the year, and raises it later in the year. The accounting treatment should have contributed no more than a few tenths of a percent to the decline in the saving rate this year.

US: Shelter from the storm

- The shelter CPI has cooled from above 8% in early 2023 to 3% oya in August, and is now running below the all-items index
- New-lease rents signal more cooling ahead, but the market-rent-to-CPI link has loosened in recent years
- We compare two approaches to forecasting shelter inflation: a new-lease rent model and a macro model incorporating broader housing market conditions
- Both models point to further shelter cooling in 2027, but the macro model implies less near-term relief for core inflation

The trajectory of shelter inflation, the largest component of the CPI, is key to the inflation outlook. Shelter accounts for 35% of the headline index and more than 40% of core. After remaining elevated while much of the rest of inflation cooled, shelter inflation has fallen from a peak of 8.2% oya in March 2023 to 3.0% in August and is now running below headline CPI inflation (Figure 1). As the FOMC considers further tightening to return inflation to 2%, a key question is how much additional shelter disinflation lies ahead.

Figure 1: CPI inflation



New-lease rent growth has been running below CPI rent inflation for some time, but models of its pass-through into shelter have performed poorly in recent years. We therefore compare a new-lease rent model with a macro model incorporating house prices and affordability. Both keep shelter near 3% through year-end before showing further cooling in the first half of 2027. The macro model projects a shallower but more sustained moderation, with shelter reaching 2.6% by end-2028. The new-lease rent model shows a sharper initial decline, to around 2.4% by mid-2027, before gradually returning toward 3% in 2028.


Built to lag

The construction of the shelter CPI explains both its persistence and why new-lease rents can provide a leading signal.

New-lease rents capture current market conditions, while the CPI reflects rents paid across the full stock of occupied units, including leases signed months or years earlier. As leases expire, today's market rents influence the terms offered to new and renewing tenants. But that signal passes into CPI shelter only gradually because leases reset infrequently, landlords tend to smooth renewal increases, and the BLS measures rent changes over six-month intervals.


That lag was evident during the recent inflation cycle. New-lease rents accelerated before CPI shelter took off and turned down well before the subsequent shelter disinflation. We track this signal using the Zillow Observed Rent Index (ZORI), which measures asking rents across single and multi-family properties. Zillow rent growth has been running below CPI rent inflation for some time now (Figure 2), suggesting that some further moderation is still in the pipeline.

Figure 2: National rent indexes



The pass-through from new leases to the broader rental stock has nevertheless become less predictable. When market rents were accelerating, renewal increases generally lagged behind new-lease rents. Now that new-lease pricing has cooled, the reverse is true: renewal increases remain positive and firmer than rents on new leases (Figure 3). [Low turnover](#) means those firmer renewal rents carry more weight in the existing stock, so the weakness in new-lease rents may reach the CPI more slowly, or less fully, than historical relationships imply.


Figure 3: Rental inflation by lease type



A broader housing signal

Broader housing market conditions may also provide useful signals for shelter inflation. House price growth has historically led the shelter CPI, while affordability captures how home prices, mortgage rates, and household income affect the choice between owning and renting. These relationships motivate a macro approach that can be estimated over a longer historical period than the Zillow series allows (Figure 4).


Figure 4: CPI shelter inflation and house prices



Different paths for disinflation

We evaluate the outlook for shelter inflation with two quarterly models. The first is a new-lease rent model based on an Almon lag framework. It relates quarterly shelter CPI growth to current and lagged growth in the Zillow Observed Rent Index, extending back eight quarters, with the coefficients constrained to trace a smooth path and fade to zero at the end of the window. This is the quarterly analogue of a [monthly model](#) we developed to forecast shelter inflation in the years immediately following the pandemic.

Figure 5: CPI shelter inflation and model-based forecasts




To extend the forecast through the end of 2028, we assume Zillow rents grow at a 3% annual pace, broadly in line with recent momentum but somewhat below the pre-pandemic trend. The assumption has little effect on the first few forecast quarters because observed Zillow movements already in the lag structure dominate the near-term path. Under this baseline, the model has shelter holding at 3.1%oya through the

end of 2026, before cooling to 2.4% through the middle of 2027. From there, the assumed 3% trend path increasingly enters the lag window, lifting the model's projection to 2.6% by end-2027 and 2.9% by end-2028 (Figure 5).


There are reasons to treat that projection cautiously. Published Zillow history is short, leaving fewer than forty quarterly observations after constructing the lag structure. The estimates are sensitive to the sample and specification, while previous vintages performed poorly around the pandemic, first underpredicting the rise in shelter inflation and then overpredicting the speed of its decline. The weakening relationship between new and existing rents compounds those concerns. The future-rent assumption is also judgmental and becomes increasingly important later in the forecast (Figure 6).

Figure 6: CPI shelter inflation in alternative scenarios for Zillow rent



As an alternative, we estimate a three-variable vector autoregression comprising shelter CPI inflation, Fannie Mae house-price growth, and the NAR Housing Affordability Index. This macro model includes three quarterly lags of each variable. Following the conditional-forecasting approach of [Waggoner and Zha \(1999\)](#), we jointly impose Fannie Mae's projected house-price path and an affordability path derived from our assumptions for income, house prices, and mortgage rates (Figure 7). The resulting shelter forecast incorporates the relationships among all three variables over the full forecast horizon.

Figure 7: Housing market forecasts



The macro model produces a modestly firmer path than the new-lease rent model through 2027. It similarly keeps shelter slightly above 3%oia around the turn of the year, but shows a shallower decline to 2.7% by mid-2027 and leaves inflation in the upper 2s through year-end. In contrast to the Zillow model, the macro model continues to moderate in 2028, reaching 2.6%oia by year-end.

It is important to note that a measurement distortion from the October 2025 government shutdown affects these year-ago paths. Missing rent observations temporarily depressed the shelter index through March 2026, before the affected rental panel was repriced in April. Because both forecasts are now appended to the same actual shelter history, they inherit the distortion from these base effects. The weak late-2025 base supports the year-ago rate around the turn of the year, while the strong 2Q26 catch-up produces a sharper decline when it enters the comparison in 2Q27.

Weighing the signals

The new-lease rent model provides a timely signal, but its short history, poor recent fit, and sensitivity to assumptions about future Zillow growth warrant caution. The macro model draws on a longer history and a broader set of housing-market information, but its reliance on shelter's historical persistence could make it slow to recognize a structural change in rent-setting behavior. On balance, we place somewhat more weight on the macro model and use the new-lease rent model to gauge risks. Both models point to further shelter cooling in 2027, but the macro model implies less near-term relief for core inflation. The Zillow model also suggests that the moderation may prove temporary if new-lease rent growth remains near 3%.

Risks to the outlook

With the Fed raising rates last week and likely to tighten further before year-end, monetary policy itself could slow shelter disinflation. [Dias and Duarte \(2019\)](#) find that contractionary policy temporarily puts upward pressure on rents as homeownership and rental vacancies decline. Our [earlier estimates](#) imply that a 50bp increase in the fed funds rate raises shelter inflation by about 0.25 percentage point over the following year, even as core CPI excluding shelter is largely unresponsive in the short run. Elevated energy prices should have little direct near-term effect on rent and OER, since OER excludes utilities and most household energy costs are measured elsewhere in the CPI; any pass-through should be indirect and lagged. Working in the opposite direction, sharply slower immigration and population growth should continue to weigh on household formation and rental demand, with population growth likely to be historically weak in 2026.

Global Data Watch: Give me that old time religion

- A cyclical uplift is kicking in, with strong growth expected for 2H26
- Rates are moving higher, with the rising tide lifting nearly all boats
- Despite these moves, markets and CBs don't price in the need for weak growth to control inflation
- Next week: US NFP (100k); Mfg PMIs; EMU/JPN inflation; RBA +25


Activity readings through August have already prompted a 0.6%-pt rise in our current-quarter GDP forecast, but this week's September DM flash PMI points to further strength. Rising to its highest level in four years, the composite activity PMI showed momentum building as the quarter ended. It also aligns with indicators showing sectoral and regional breadth, a message consistent with our view that several forces outside of tech are now lifting growth. The survey highlights a pickup in service sector activity alongside solid manufacturing growth. Regionally, the US surged in September but the exceptional element of the report was a Euro area increase despite renewed energy price pressures. As our forecasts continue to adjust to incoming news, it is reasonable to assess 2H26 GDP growth as tracking around a 3%ar pace in the US and 1.5%ar in Western Europe and Japan. With confidence building that an imbalanced China is receiving a significant fiscal impulse, and that other Asia tech exporters are still booming, the global expansion appears to have entered a phase of broad-based strength rarely seen over the past two decades.

Amidst strong growth and firming perceptions of resilience to high energy prices, it is no surprise that interest rates are moving higher while equity prices remain close to record levels. Our G4 policy rate expectations through mid-2027 have moved up roughly 40bp over the past two months, but adjustments reflecting the synchronization of growth and inflation dynamics are evolving more slowly (Figure 1). This week we saw hikes from Norges Bank and SARB, and we expect a hike from the RBA next week. We also changed views this week to anticipate a hike from the Bank of Thailand.

Markets expect larger and more synchronized hikes than our forecasts. But what is most notable about recent market moves is their extension of higher policy rates well beyond the coming year. Indeed, a proxy for DM terminal rates (one-year yields, three years ahead) has moved up roughly 50bp over the past month (Figure 2). With no material move toward higher inflation compensation, markets have shifted their medium-term perspective on the appropriate real policy rate, believing central bank tightening will not derail the expansion.

Figure 1: JPM policy rate fcst evolution, 2Q27


Bp, revision since start of year; both scales



Source: J.P. Morgan Global Economics

Figure 2: 1 year rates, 3 years forward

%-pt change over 1m



Source: J.P. Morgan Global Economics

It is harder to articulate the motivation behind the tightening from a diverse group of central banks. There is clearly a sympathetic reassessment of near-term neutral rates underway, but most central bankers see hiking as a response to near-term pressures that will eventually be reversed. This is the message from the US SEP, in which policy rates and inflation are projected to eventually move lower.


What is absent in both market and central bank signals is the need for a growth sacrifice to lower inflation. The absence of any material up-and-down rate and inflation cycle in market pricing is mirrored in central bank guidance around growth. No major central bank is motivating hikes at present by a need to generate sub-par growth or rising unemployment. Both Fed and ECB forecasts incorporate sustained above-trend growth and a gradual path where inflation declines toward target.

Beneath the surface, changing views on growth resilience and the appropriate policy stance sharply contrast with two beliefs held by markets and central banks. The first is immaculate disinflation—a belief that inflation will gradually return to central bank targets without a need for a period of weak demand. The second belief is that policymakers remain New Testament deities, forgiving of our inflation sins. While adjusting policy rates to reflect a higher neutral rate of interest (r^*), policymakers are expected to tolerate a further period of sticky inflation without actively hiking to promote weakness. From our perspective, the greatest risk to the expansion is that these views are shaken and rate hikes become more “Old Testament” in pushing rates high enough to smite growth and strike down high inflation.

As we move along this path of synchronized strong growth, we see rising risks of a return to this “old time religion” coming from two sources.


- **The return of the common.** The interaction of strong global growth, buoyant commodity prices and supply-chain pressures is reviving a [common global inflation impulse](#). Pressure on goods prices is most significant: we project a sharp acceleration to a 2.5%*ar* rise in global core goods prices over the coming six months. Core service price inflation is unwinding an acceleration in the early months of this year and benefits from moderating wage gains. But firming demand and rising costs look poised to blunt this disinflationary impulse, a point emphasized by business surveys (Figure 3).

Figure 3: DM service prices and wages



- **Recoupling remains reasonable.** Although wage inflation moved lower through 1H26, the broad forces promoting above-potential global growth are beginning to show up in tightening labor markets (Figure 4). We continue to expect a pick-up in global employment growth to lower unemployment rates and turn the tide on wage inflation later this year. Next week we forecast a second consecutive triple-digit US job gain.

Figure 4: Global output gap and unemployment



DM tightening broadens

Renewed supply pressures are pushing DM central banks toward tighter policy, even as domestic growth conditions vary. We expect Australia’s RBA to resume hiking next week after a three-month pause, taking cumulative tightening this year to 100bp. This comes despite unemployment reaching a five-year high and clear evidence that restrictive policy is slowing the economy. The RBA appears focused on managing the risk that renewed supply shocks push inflation away from its forecast path. This more aggressive reaction function creates some risk of a follow-up move in November, although our core inflation forecast should allow the RBA to avoid it.

In the Euro area, this week’s flash PMI points to GDP growth accelerating to a solid 1.7%*ar*, suggesting the economy is absorbing the sharp rise in energy prices remarkably well. This resilience is likely to tilt the ECB further in a hawkish direction and makes six hikes in total increasingly plausible,

one more than in our forecast. Limited evidence of second-round effects reduces the urgency for an October move, but next week's expected rise in headline HICP to 3.6%ooya could strengthen the case for both a faster pace and a peak above 3%.

The BoE continues to signal a quarterly tightening pace, and we retain our call for a hike at the next meeting in November. This week's weaker PMI and steady wage data provide little reason to accelerate, even as MPC commentary reinforced the case for continued tightening while the energy shock persists. We therefore see little pressure for another move as early as December.

Scandinavian central banks are also moving higher. Norges Bank raised rates to 4.5% this week and pivoted toward a high-for-long stance, but stronger global growth and building import-price pressures should eventually challenge that guidance. We expect another hike in 1Q27 before an extended hold. The Riksbank stayed on hold but effectively signaled the start of a tightening cycle. We now expect three hikes by 2Q27, beginning in December, with a significant risk that the first move comes in November and that the cycle ultimately extends further.

China's fiscal impulse builds

China's fiscal execution is finally turning the corner. September government bond issuance is on track to approach CNY2tn, lifting progress toward 80% of the annual target, while the CNY800bn policy-bank facility has begun funding infrastructure, AI, advanced manufacturing, and other strategic projects. This should gradually support investment and industrial production, although weak housing and consumption will keep the recovery measured. The key question is how quickly stronger fiscal execution translates into activity, particularly if renewed Middle East tensions raise energy, freight, and insurance costs. For now, we expect next week's manufacturing PMIs to improve, with the NBS index rising to 50.1 and the RatingDog measure holding at 51.5. Near-term external risks have also eased, with the US-China tariff and critical-minerals truce extended to January 10, although the Trump-Xi summit is likely to stabilize managed competition rather than deliver a broader policy reset.

Asia's last holdouts fall

EM Asia's tightening cycle continues to broaden. The main forecast change this week is in Thailand, where we now expect three 25bp BoT hikes starting in 1Q27 to 1.75% by end-2027. Weak growth keeps the near-term hurdle high, but improving activity and increasingly persistent inflation should gradually create room for rate normalization. Elsewhere, global pressures continue to reinforce the regional tightening

bias, with the RBI and BSP both likely to deliver October hikes. Bank Indonesia held at 5.75% this week, but mounting FX pressure supports our call for a 25bp hike in December and creates upside risk to the hiking cycle. Taiwan's CBC remains the final policy holdout: we continue to expect no hikes in 2026, although strong tech growth is increasing the likelihood that it too will join the tightening cycle.

EMEA EM patience wears thin

Rising DM rates, higher energy prices, and tighter global financial conditions are increasingly steering the region toward policy tightening. The SARB unanimously raised rates 25bp to 7.25% this week following July's surprise hold, citing persistent oil pressures, second-round inflation risks, and the hawkish global backdrop. We now see a roughly 25% probability of another hike in November and close to even odds of a January move, with global factors likely to be key for the decision. Poland faces its own test next week, with headline CPI expected to jump from 3.1%ooya to 4.1%ooya as fuel inflation approaches 40%. Our expectation that core CPI eases to 3.1%ooya supports an NBP hold, but the November projections will be critical: a persistent inflation path near 4% could trigger 50-75bp of tightening, while a temporary energy-led spike should allow rates to remain unchanged.

Policy challenges re-emerge in Mexico

While the tariff exemptions and resilient US demand prevented a recession in Mexico, investment woes related to uncertainty over USMCA have kept domestic demand in low gear—the economy expanded 0.5% y/y in 2025 and is poised to recover toward a trend-like pace this year. Since the US did not endorse an automatic renewal of USMCA in July, Mexico has actively sought bilateral talks. Little progress has been made, and news of a potential US export ban on diesel has added to the concerns. With near-term policy levers limited, the government is looking for medium-term solutions—such as the multi-year investment plan announced last year to allure private investors into energy and infrastructure projects. The good news is that there are hints that investments are coming back to life.

US Indicator forecasts

J.P. Morgan Research versus the consensus

Release date/ Indicator	J.P. Morgan forecast	Consensus median	Consensus range
Tue, Sep 29			
Consumer confidence (Sep)	89.0	89.7	86.8 to 92.7
JOLTS (Aug)	7400k	7228k	7125k to 7400k
Wed, Sep 30			
Real GDP (2Q third)	1.7%	1.5%	1.5% to 1.7%
Personal income (Aug)	0.5%	0.5%	0.3% to 0.7%
Consumption	1.0%	0.8%	0.5% to 0.9%
Core PCE deflator	0.25%	0.3%	0.1% to 0.3%
Advance economic indicators (Aug)			
Trade balance	-\$121.0bn	-\$114.8bn	-\$125.0bn to -\$105.0bn
Thu, Oct 01			
Initial claims (w/e Sep 26)	205k	200k	195k to 210k
Manufacturing PMI (Sep final)	56.0	57.0	55.5 to 57.0
ISM manufacturing (Sep)	54.5	55.0	53.8 to 55.5
Construction spending (Aug)	0.1%	-0.1%	-0.2% to 0.5%
Light vehicle sales (Sep)	16.0 mn	16.5 mn	16.2 mn to 16.9 mn
Fri, Oct 02			
Employment (Sep)	100	100k	35k to 180k
Unemployment rate	4.1%	4.1%	4.0% to 4.2%
Average hourly earnings	0.2%	0.3%	0.2% to 0.4%
Average weekly hours	34.4	34.4	34.3 to 34.5

Source: J.P. Morgan, consensus forecasts reported by Bloomberg Finance L.P.

Sources for all: ADP/Moody's Analytics, BEA, BLS, Census Bureau, Conference Board, Department of Labor, Federal Reserve Board, ISM, J.P. Morgan forecasts, NAHB, NAR, NFIB, NY Fed, Philadelphia Fed, S&P Global, Standard & Poor's, University of Michigan, US Treasury


JOLTS					
Thousands, sa, unless noted					
	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	
Job openings	7537	7182	7271	7400	
Job openings rate (%)	4.5	4.3	4.4	4.4	
Hires	5252	5332	5054		
Hires rate (%)	3.3	3.4	3.2		
Separations	5260	5337	5072		
Separations rate (%)	3.3	3.4	3.2		
Quits	3153	3213	3056		
Quits rate (%)	2.0	2.0	1.9		
Layoffs	1761	1785	1666		
Layoffs rate (%)	1.1	1.1	1.0		

We project job openings in August as reported by the JOLTS report to rise to 7400mn from 7271mn in July, leaving the openings rate steady at 4.4%. The Indeed index of new job openings remained broadly stable between the end of July and August, falling from 102.1 to 101.9, while the NFIB survey's share of firms planning to increase employment inched down to 17% from a recent peak of 20% in July. The labor market differential from the Conference Board consumer confidence report rose to 7.5% for August, after reaching a low for the cycle at 2.7% in the prior month.

The layoff and discharge rate has remained subdued. The information sector, which saw layoff rates spike through the beginning of the year, reversed much of that surge in July, falling 60bp along with a 20bp rise in openings, consistent with [headlines about firms in the sector](#) launching initiatives to re-hire former workers.

Job openings rate

Percent, sa



Source: BLS, J.P. Morgan

Daily Indeed job postings


Index, sa



Source: Indeed, J.P. Morgan

Layoff and discharge rate: information

Percent, sa




Source: BLS, J.P. Morgan

Consumer confidence					
Sa					
	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	
Conference Bd index	92.2	90.2	89.4	89.0	
Present situation	118.5	114.4	121.2		
Jobs plentiful	25.5	24.4	27.0		
Jobs hard to get	21.7	21.7	19.5		
Labor mkt diff	3.8	2.7	7.5		
Expectations	74.7	74.0	68.2		


We expect consumer confidence in the Conference Board survey for September to move down to 89.0 from 89.4 in the prior month. The series has been on a steady decline since last summer, with the latest 0.8 point drop in August driven by the expectations component. The present situation index rose 6.8 points last month and the expectations metric fell close to 6 points, as respondents reacted to higher gasoline prices amid renewed tensions in the Middle East conflict.

The labor market differential, which measures the number of respondents saying jobs are plentiful less the share saying jobs are hard to find, rose to 7.5% in August from the lowest level in the cycle at 2.7% in the prior month. While this metric is still below levels seen during the end of last year, the direction of travel aligns with the recent fall in the unemployment rate.

Conference Board consumer confidence



Unemployment rate and Conference Board labor market differential



Personal income

Wed Sep 30 %m/m, sa, unless noted
8:30am

	May	Jun	Jul	Aug
Personal income	0.7	0.2	0.4	<u>0.5</u>
Wages & salaries	0.4	0.1	0.3	<u>0.6</u>
Disposable personal income	0.7	0.2	0.5	<u>0.5</u>
Real disposable personal income	0.2	0.3	0.4	<u>0.2</u>
Consumption	0.9	0.3	0.2	<u>1.0</u>
Real consumption	0.4	0.4	0.0	<u>0.7</u>
PCE price index	0.5	-0.1	0.2	<u>0.32</u>
PCE price index (%oya)	4.1	3.7	3.7	<u>3.63</u>
Core price index	0.4	0.2	0.2	<u>0.25</u>
Core price index (%oya)	3.5	3.3	3.3	<u>3.28</u>
Mkt-Based Core	0.2	0.2	0.2	
Mkt-Based Core (%oya)	3.2	3.0	3.0	
Saving rate	2.8	2.6	3.0	<u>2.5</u>


We expect the core PCE deflator to have risen 0.25%/m in August, moving the over-year-ago pace to 3.28%. This forecast is based on already released data from the CPI, PPI, and import price reports. [As previously noted](#), the BEA will be releasing methodology changes for PCE deflators across software and accessories, portfolio management fees, and legal services. We recently published additional discussion on the portfolio management revisions [here](#). Our estimates for the month-on-month and over-year-ago changes reflect these methodology revisions. We expect the revisions lower the over-year-ago rate for core PCE as of July by 15-20bp.

We look for a strong rise in nominal consumption as retail sales jumped 1.0% in August. Amazon moved its Prime Day sale from July to June this year, which raised reported growth rates in June and August and depressed them in July. Our


[Chase card spending data](#) suggests that spending growth is moderating in September.

Employee compensation is expected to rise 0.6%/m/m, tracking aggregate weekly payrolls from the August employment report, while total personal income is set to rise 0.5%. However, firm inflation data points to real DPI rising 0.2%, which should move the savings rate down to 2.5% after a brief improvement in the prior month to 3.0%. [We recently commented on the falling savings rate](#), which could rebuild in the coming months without a hit to consumers if gas prices were to moderate.


Core PCE deflator: goods vs. services



Core PCE, before and after methodology updates, through July




Real consumption and real income growth



Personal saving rate

Percent, sa



Source: BEA, J.P. Morgan

Wed
Sep 30
8:30am

Gross domestic product

%ch, q/q, saar, real, unless noted

	2Q26	Adv 2Q26	Sec 2Q26	Third 2Q26
Real GDP	2.1	1.5	1.5	1.7
(%oya)	2.7	2.1	2.1	2.2
Final Sales	1.9	2.2	2.2	2.4
(%oya)	3.5	2.2	2.2	2.3
Domestic final sales	2.2	3.1	3.3	3.3
(%oya)	2.0	2.2	2.2	2.2
Net exports (pct.pt.contr.)	-0.4	-1.0	-1.1	-0.9
Inventories (pct.pt.contr.)	0.2	-0.7	-0.7	-0.7
Consumption	0.5	3.2	3.4	3.4
Equipment	15.8	15.2	13.6	13.5
Intellectual property	13.8	8.8	8.8	8.9
Nonres. structures	-4.7	-5.0	-1.8	-1.8
Residential investment	-7.8	1.5	1.3	1.2
Government	4.4	-0.8	-1.0	-1.0
Exports	10.9	4.5	4.5	0.0
Imports	11.8	11.5	12.5	0.0
Net exports (\$bn)	-1001.8	-1074.7	-1083.7	-1067.8
Inventories (ch, \$bn)	-16.7	-50.8	-53.1	-51.9
Nominal GDP	5.8	7.9	8.0	8.1
(%oya)	6.1	6.5	6.6	6.6
GDP chain price index	3.6	6.2	6.4	
(%oya)	3.3	4.3	4.4	
PCE price index	0.5	3.2	3.4	
(%oya)	3.1	3.8	3.9	
Core PCE price index	4.4	3.4	3.6	3.4
(%oya)	3.1	3.3	3.4	3.2
Corporate profits (%q, sa)	1.7		9.1	
(%oya)	12.8		22.8	
Employee compensation	3.4	3.7	3.6	
(%oya)	3.7	4.0	3.9	
Wages and salaries	3.4	3.8	3.6	
(%oya)	3.6	4.0	3.9	

We forecast a 1.7%/q/q saar increase in real GDP in the revised 2Q26 report, up 0.2%-pt from the BEA's second estimate. We anticipate minor changes across most components.

This report will incorporate the [annual update by BEA](#). On methodology, the only change is the PCE deflator updates that we discuss in more detail in the August personal income and outlays preview. The table above shows the effect of these revisions for the 2Q26 core PCE deflator, which we think will lower the over-year-aug rate from 3.4% to 3.2%.

The other annual updates will include new source data, which along with the methodology updates affect GDP and GDI back to 2021. The new source data includes:

- The Annual Integrated Economic Survey (AIES) for

2023. This integrates a number of previously separate Census Bureau surveys.

- IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) data for 2023.
- Compustat and FDIC data for 2025.
- Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages for 1Q26.
- The latest annual update to the international trade data, which was published in June.
- Other smaller updates.

The changes stemming from new data usually get relatively little attention. Perhaps the most interesting thing will be changes in the saving rate, which often gets revised up over time.

International trade (adv.)


\$bn, samr, unless noted

	May	Jun	Jul	Aug
Balance of goods, Cen. basis	-105.3	-101.1	-118.9	-121.0
Exports (%samr)	-5.0	-1.7	-2.9	-0.2
Imports (%samr)	4.0	-2.5	3.9	0.5

We expect the trade deficit to widen to \$121.0bn from \$118.9bn in August. COMEX data on gold inventories and prices points to a material rise in inventories, which could boost imports. Elevated demand and rising prices for tech products are also likely to keep upward pressure on capital goods imports. Vessel cargo traffic estimates from IMF Port-Watch, in seasonally adjusted terms, indicated a slight moderation in exports last month, although swings in global energy prices and demand could buoy the index as exports of petroleum products increase.

Goods trade balance

\$bn, sa, Customs basis



Source: Census Bureau, J.P. Morgan

Business inventories (adv.)

%m/m, sa, unless noted

	May	Jun	Jul	Aug
Wholesale	0.3	0.4	1.3	0.8
Retail inventories	0.8	-0.2	0.8	0.3
Ex autos	0.7	-0.5	0.8	0.3
Autos	0.9	0.5	0.8	0.2

We look for wholesale inventories to rise 0.8%/m/m in August and retail inventories to be up 0.3%. Swings in wholesale inventories likely reflect the recently volatile PPI for refined petroleum products, which rose 11.8% in August.

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North America Economic Research
US Weekly Prospects
25 September 2026

J.P.Morgan


Thu Oct 1 8:30am	Jobless claims Thousands, sa	New claims (wr.)		Continuing claims		Insured Jobless, %	
		Wkly	4-wk avg	Wkly	4-wk avg		
		Jul 18 ¹	189	208	1777	1796	1.2
		Jul 25	198	203	1799	1791	1.2
		Aug 1	200	199	1781	1787	1.2
		Aug 8	212	200	1796	1788	1.2
		Aug 15 ¹	207	204	1771	1787	1.2
		Aug 22	204	206	1775	1781	1.2
		Aug 29	207	208	1765	1777	1.1
		Sep 5	207	206	1717	1757	1.1
		Sep 12 ¹	198	204	1719	1744	1.1
		Sep 19	197	202			
		Sep 26	<u>205</u>	<u>202</u>			
	1. Payroll survey week						

1. Payroll survey week


We look for initial jobless claims to rise to 205k in the week ending September 26 from 197k in the prior week. The series continues to send a positive message on the labor market, running well below levels seen in prior years. Some of this uptick in the coming report could reflect residual seasonality, which would move the series slightly higher into this week but push it lower into the end of the year.

Continuing claims points toward declining unemployment. Continuing claims in the September household reference week fell by 52k from the August reference week. The four-week average of continuing claims is the lowest since early summer of 2023, with the over-year-ago pace falling to another cycle low of 9.5%.

Initial jobless claims, comparison by week to prior years (SA)



Continuing jobless claims, by week of the year (SA)



Thu Oct 1 9:45am	S&P Global manufacturing PMI (US final) Index, sa	Aug 25		Aug 26		Flash	Final
						Sep 26	Sep 26
	Composite	53.0	53.9	57.0			<u>56.0</u>
	Output	55.2	53.1	56.7			
	ISM-weighted composite	52.5	53.8	56.8			

Thu Oct 1 10:00am	ISM manufacturing Sa	Jun		Jul		Aug		Sep
								Sep
	Overall index	53.3	55.6	54.6				<u>54.5</u>
	New orders	56.0	56.7	53.7				
	Production	52.2	58.5	58.3				
	Employment	49.7	52.8	51.2				
	Supplier deliveries	57.4	58.9	59.3				
	Inventories	51.4	51.2	50.6				
	Export orders	48.5	53.0	53.2				
	Imports	52.9	55.7	52.5				
	Prices	73.0	71.1	71.1				


We look for the ISM manufacturing composite in September to tick down to 54.5 from 54.6 in August, and the final PMI manufacturing print to edge down to 56.0 from 57.0 in its flash estimate. The latest PMI report sent a stronger-than-expected signal for manufacturing activity, with the output index rising to a cycle high despite building price pressures and continued supply chain challenges, as new orders rose to 57.3 from 54.3 and output grew to 56.7 from 53.1. The ISM has been running below the PMI, and the average ISM-weighted composite from the Empire, Philadelphia, Richmond and Kansas City Fed surveys dropped to 55.0 in September from 55.7 in August.

New orders in the ISM survey moderated from a recent peak of 56.7 in July to 53.7 in August, while the production index edged down from 58.5 to 58.3. Meanwhile, a rise in employment gauges has been a welcome development, with the reading in the September flash PMI surging to 55.8, similar to levels seen during the post-Covid spike. The ISM employment measure has also improved in recent reports, rising to 52.8 in July before inching down to 51.2 in August. Backlogs of work have also crept higher since early this year, likely boosting demand for workers in the segment.

The more concerning aspect of the surveys has been continued evidence of building inflationary pressures as global energy prices climb higher. Input prices in the flash September PMI jumped to 68.1 from 65.2 in August. Output prices ticked lower to a still-elevated level of 59.2 from 59.4.

ISM manufacturing index and regional ISM-weighted composites


index, sa



Source: ISM, Federal Reserve Banks of NY and Philadelphia, J.P. Morgan

PMI and ISM manufacturing composites

Diffusion index, sa



Source: S&P Global, ISM, J.P. Morgan

PMI and ISM manufacturing prices

Diffusion index



Source: S&P Global, ISM, J.P. Morgan

Construction spending					
Thu Oct 1 10:00am	%m/m, sa	May	Jun	Jul	Aug
Nominal		0.0	0.0	-0.5	<u>0.1</u>
Private		-0.2	-0.1	-0.5	<u>-0.1</u>
Residential		-0.8	-0.5	-1.3	<u>-0.5</u>
New residential		-0.6	-0.3	-2.4	<u>-1.0</u>
Improvements		-1.1	-0.8	0.3	
Nonresidential		0.6	0.4	0.4	<u>0.4</u>
Public		0.6	0.1	-0.2	<u>0.5</u>

We expect total construction spending to inch up 0.1%/m/m in August after a 0.5% decline in the prior month. Much of the recent weakness has been driven by the new residential segment, as the pace of new housing starts for single-family units continues to moderate. In August, despite an improvement in single-family housing starts, the average sales price for a new

single-family house fell 9.0%, which could weigh on headline construction spending.


Starts in the category are down 3.0% since the beginning of the year and growth in building permits has been flat. Rising mortgage rates are likely to exacerbate already muted sales growth, as consumers face affordability concerns and builders work through elevated inventory levels, offering incentives and price cuts.

Outside of the residential sector, private nonresidential construction picked up in recent months after plateauing through the turn of the year. Spending on data center buildout has been robust, jumping 6.2%/m/m (+57%oya) in July alone. The manufacturing category has been losing altitude, with a 0.8% decline in the last print as the earlier boost from the CHIPS Act, which drove spending on semiconductor plants, continues to fade.

Turning to the public sector, employment in heavy and civil engineering construction is up 0.8% cumulatively over the last four months, which could point to some further spending on highway and street construction, the largest category within public spending.

Main categories of construction spending, nominal


Index, sa



Source: Census Bureau, J.P. Morgan

Leading indicators of residential construction spending


Mn units, sa



Source: Census Bureau, J.P. Morgan

Private nonresidential construction

\$bn, sa; both scales



Source: Census Bureau, J.P. Morgan

Light vehicle sales

Millions, saar

	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
Light trucks and autos	16.7	16.3	16.8	<u>16.0</u>
Domestics	12.9	12.5	12.7	
Autos	1.9	1.8	1.8	
Light trucks	11.0	10.6	10.9	
Imports	3.9	3.9	4.0	

Our autos equity team expects light vehicle sales in September to drop to 16.0mn from 16.8mn in the prior month. Some of this weakness is due to the late Labor Day holiday timing, which could have pulled sales into August, resulting in a stronger-than-expected print for that month.

Labor-market report

	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
Payroll employment (ch, m/m, 000s)	31	21	162	<u>100</u>
Private payrolls	26	71	127	<u>100</u>
Goods-producing	14	29	41	<u>25</u>
Construction	3	18	22	<u>10</u>
Manufacturing	13	14	16	<u>15</u>
Service-providing	17	-8	121	<u>75</u>
Private service-providing	12	42	86	<u>75</u>
Wholesale trade	5	5	8	
Retail trade	10	13	1	
Professional services	36	15	10	
Temporary help	17	5	7	
Education/health	50	12	29	
Leisure and hospitality	-54	-21	62	
Government	5	-50	35	<u>0</u>
Average weekly hours	34.3	34.3	34.4	<u>34.4</u>
Index, hrs worked (%m/m)	0.0	0.1	0.3	<u>0.1</u>
Hourly earnings (%m/m)	0.3	0.2	0.3	<u>0.20</u>
(%oya)	3.4	3.2	3.1	<u>3.1</u>
Unemployment rate (%)	4.2	4.1	4.1	<u>4.1</u>
Participation rate (%)	61.5	61.4	61.6	<u>61.7</u>

We expect that nonfarm payrolls rose 100k total (and 100k private) in September and that the unemployment rate held at 4.1%. We also expect that average hourly earnings rose 0.2%/m/m (3.1%oya), and that the workweek held at 34.4.

Establishment survey

Over the last three months total payroll growth has averaged 71k per month, with the private sector averaging 75k. The

trailing average could remain similar after revisions: August job gains have tended to be revised lower in recent years, albeit not always in the first revision, but the second revision of July has tended to be positive. Our forecast is thus slightly faster than the recent trend.

NFP growth, average over recent months (000s)

	12 months	6 months	3 months
Total	50	107	71
Private	68	106	75
Federal govt	-20	-3	-4
S&L govt	3	3	0
Total ex federal govt	70	109	75


Source: BLS, J.P. Morgan

After a few quarters of sluggish GDP gains, growth looks to have accelerated in 3Q. Our GDP tracking is at 3.5% but with upside risks, and while the PMIs have a loose high-frequency relationship to growth, the very strong September reading pointed to around a 5% annualized pace. That is one reason to expect a solid job gain, independent of the more employment-specific leading indicators. Still, we wouldn't lean too much on this: last year the economy averaged 4.1% growth in the middle half of the year, yet delivered private-sector job gains of just 31k over that stretch. In addition, the natural choppi-ness in payrolls could deliver a softer month after a 162k increase in August.

In terms of the leading employment indicators, the four-week average gain in ADP private payrolls has accelerated to 80k in the week ending September 5 from 40k in the August payroll week. Weekly jobless claims also remain in excellent shape. Initial claims declined 9k between the August and September payroll weeks—though the four-week average was flat—and continuing claims fell 52k. Initial claims continue to run well below year-ago levels as they have since the spring, and continuing claims continue to drift down.

ADP four week change in private payroll employment

Cumulative change in 000s, sa




Source: ADP, J.P. Morgan

The PMI employment indicator was very strong in September, though as recently as May it was particularly weak. In May it hit a cycle low of 47.9, and since then it has steadily

risen to 55.4, the highest in over four years. Note that this is a noisy indicator of employment, and a gradual decline between June 2025 and this May actually correlated with a gradually *accelerating* pace of job growth. Regional Fed surveys have also been more stable in recent months.

PMI all-industry employment vs. nonfarm payrolls



For job openings, the daily Indeed measure has been increasing since the start of June. It's still largely flat over the last year, though the combined signal from JOLTS and Indeed is that job openings have at least stabilized after earlier declines.

Labor market indicators


	Sep 25	Apr 26	May 26	Jun 26	Jul 26	Aug 26	Sep 26
Nonfarm payroll employment (m/m ch, 000s)	76	148	63	31	21	162	
Ex federal government	78	149	59	31	27	167	
Private	68	150	61	26	71	127	
Initial jobless claims (payroll reference week)	233	215	210	227	189	207	198
Four-week average	239	211	203	224	208	204	204
Continuing jobless claims (payroll reference week)	1,916	1,776	1,785	1,812	1,777	1,771	1,719
Four-week average	1,926	1,795	1,773	1,792	1,796	1,787	1,744
CB labor market differential	8.7	7.5	5.0	3.8	2.7	7.5	
PMI all-industry employment	50.6	50.2	47.9	49.1	50.8	53.3	55.4
ISM all-industry employment	47.4	47.9	48.0	51.1	47.8	48.1	
Fed surveys all-industry employment	49.1	51.2	51.8	51.7	52.2	50.8	51.0
Chicago Fed CFSEC current hiring	-24.3	-19.3	-6.1	-3.9	-1.3	-16.1	-5.3
NFIB: net % percent planning to increase employment	16	13	9	11	20	17	
NFIB: % of firms with open positions	32	34	29	32	36	35	
Indeed job openings index (average)	102.8	102.7	101.9	100.8	101.6	101.9	102.9
FRB Cleveland WARN factor (layoff indicator, nsa)	-0.12	-0.06	-0.16	-0.51	-0.31	-0.11	
Challenger announced job cuts (000s, nsa)	54	83	97	46	33	53	
Ex government	50	74	93	44	30	51	
Census BTOS employee index (average, nsa)	47.6	48.0	48.4	48.7	48.6	48.2	47.8
ADP private employment (m/m ch, 000s)	88	105	122	95	46	38	
Revelio private employment (m/m ch, 000s)	36	26	-15	45	12	13	
Revelio government employment (m/m ch, 000s)	-5	-1	-4	6	40	26	
Intuit small business employment (%m/m)	0.59	-0.07	-0.05	-0.08	-0.09	-0.09	

Source: BLS, DoL, S&P Global, ISM, Federal Reserve system, NFIB, Indeed, Challenger, ADP, Revelio, Intuit, J.P. Morgan

Daily employment data from Homebase is mildly soft, having gone from just above the trend of recent years in August to more in line in September.

Homebase index, 7-day average of daily employment

Index, nsa. Vertical bars are week ending Sat including the 12th of the month



The Labor Day holiday was on the 7th this year, the latest possible position in the calendar. That pushes the holiday into the September payroll survey week. Looking at all non-COVID years since 1990, we don't see this causing a directional bias in total employment growth, as measured by comparing job growth in September to the trailing three-month average.

There may be an upward bias to leisure and hospitality, as all six observations we have in which the holiday fell on the 6th or 7th of the month are above trend. Leisure and hospitality is coming off a strong 62k increase, the most since early 2023, but this only partially re-traced a June/July drop, so this sector could have another solid month.

Local government educational employment fell 58k in July and rose 42k in August, likely seasonal noise, but employment is still well off the March high. This could reflect staffing reductions made before the new school year in response to an earlier end to federal post-pandemic aid. Consequently, we don't expect jobs to rapidly recover back toward the earlier peak.


After being a key support for the economy in recent years education and healthcare employment growth is showing signs of slowing, adding only 30k jobs per month over the last three months, half the pace of last year. Fortunately, employment in the rest of the private sector, which is more cyclical, has risen since the start of the year, reversing earlier declines. While information and financial activities continue to decline, jobs are rebounding in manufacturing, trade and transportation, and professional and business services.

Revisions

Pre-COVID, September and August payrolls were both routinely revised up. Since COVID, August has tended to be revised down (though more likely in the second revision) while there isn't a clear pattern for September. July has had a tendency to be revised up in its second print in recent years, though there was a small negative revision last year. Across all months in a year, revisions tended to be negative from 2023-25, but have been more balanced in 2026.

Revisions to September nonfarm payrolls


000s, sa; 2021 is truncated



Source: BLS, J.P. Morgan

Revision pattern for July and August payrolls


000s, sa



Source: BLS, J.P. Morgan

Revision to change in nonfarm payrolls, 1st to 3rd estimate

000s, sa. Last bar is 1st to 2nd estimate




Source: BLS, J.P. Morgan

Hours and earnings

The workweek increased to 34.4 in August for the first time since early 2024. In the months before that it had started to hold more consistently at 34.3 instead of chopping back between 34.2 and 34.3. The workweek is a cyclical indicator and we expect that the gradual tightening in the labor market will sustain the workweek at 34.4 into September. There has been a notable pickup in goods-producing industries over the last year, and the September PMI manufacturing survey was strong, including in its employment details.

Average weekly hours by industry

Hours, sa, both scales




Source: BLS, J.P. Morgan

We look for average hourly earnings to increase 0.2%/m, which would maintain the over-year-ago rate at 3.1%. Based on the number of weekdays in September (22) we expect average hourly earnings to run at or slightly below the trailing three-month average, which was 0.23%/m. Wage growth has been gradually decelerating, but that trend could soon abate, as unemployment falls and the vacancy/unemployment ratio has edged up.

Average hourly earnings growth

Percent, sa




Source: BLS, J.P. Morgan

Household survey

The unemployment rate was 4.14% in August, just barely rounding down to 4.1%. The signal from continuing jobless claims is that unemployment should drift lower over time, and some other leading indicators of unemployment have also started to improve. Because the rounded unemployment rate is already so close to 4.2% we expect the rounded rate holds at 4.1%. But we expect the unrounded value to fall and see a chance of the rate rounding to 4.0%.

Unemployment rate vs. continuing claims to labor force ratio


Unemployment rate



Source: Department of Labor, BLS, J.P. Morgan


We don't yet have the July readings on Conference Board consumer confidence and the NFIB survey, though their labor details have improved slightly recently, especially NFIB. The Conference Board labor market differential still suggests a higher absolute level of unemployment, but it has lagged the improvement in unemployment this cycle.

Unemployment rate and Conference Board labor market differential



Source: BLS, Conference Board, J.P. Morgan

Unemployment rate vs. NFIB plans to hire




Source: BLS, NFIB, J.P. Morgan

We look for the participation rate to increase from 61.6% to 61.7%, continuing to recover slightly from the recent cycle low of 61.4% in July. The unrounded rate was already 61.64% in August, and residual seasonality could boost participation among 16-24 year olds. Participation is also still slightly depressed among 25-34 year olds after an unusual dip in June, so there could be room for further recovery.

Labor force participation rate


Percent, sa



Source: BLS, J.P. Morgan

Participation rate by age group

Percent, sa, both scales



Source: BLS, J.P. Morgan

J.P. Morgan US forecast

	%q/q, saar								%q4/q4			%y/y		
	4Q25	1Q26	2Q26	3Q26	4Q26	1Q27	2Q27	3Q27	2025	2026	2027	2025	2026	2027
Gross domestic product														
Real GDP	0.5	2.1	1.5	3.5	1.8	2.3	2.3	1.8	2.0	2.2	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.2
Final sales	0.3	1.9	2.2	2.3	1.2	2.2	2.2	1.8	2.2	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.3	1.9
Domestic	0.6	2.2	3.3	3.8	2.2	2.4	2.4	1.9	1.8	2.9	2.2	2.4	2.4	2.5
Consumer spending	1.9	0.5	3.4	3.5	1.5	2.0	2.0	1.5	2.1	2.2	1.7	2.6	2.3	2.1
Business investment	2.4	10.6	8.5	9.3	6.4	4.6	4.6	3.7	5.6	8.7	4.1	4.1	7.1	5.5
Equipment	4.3	15.8	13.6	15.0	10.0	5.0	5.0	4.0	9.6	13.6	4.5	8.3	10.9	7.4
Structures	-6.5	-4.7	-1.8	1.5	-4.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	-5.5	-2.3	2.0	-5.3	-3.9	0.5
Intellectual property products	5.4	13.8	8.8	7.0	7.0	5.0	5.0	4.0	8.0	9.1	4.5	5.6	9.0	5.7
Residential investment	-1.7	-7.8	1.3	-2.0	0.0	4.0	6.0	3.0	-3.8	-2.2	4.0	-2.2	-3.6	2.5
Government	-5.6	4.4	-1.0	1.2	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.5	-1.2	1.5	1.5	1.1	0.3	1.3
Net exports (\$bn, chained \$2017)	-969	-1002	-1084	-1188	-1257	-1277	-1297	-1310	-	-	-	-	-	-
Exports (goods and services)	-3.2	10.9	4.5	1.0	2.5	1.5	1.5	1.0	1.1	4.7	1.2	1.6	4.2	1.7
Imports (goods and services)	-1.0	11.8	12.5	12.0	9.0	3.0	3.0	2.0	-1.9	11.3	2.5	2.7	4.1	5.5
Inventories (ch \$bn, chained \$2017)	-15.6	-16.7	-53.1	20.6	56.6	61.4	62.4	61.2	-	-	-	-	-	-
Contribution to real GDP growth (% pts):														
Domestic final sales	0.6	2.2	3.4	4.0	2.3	2.5	2.6	2.0	1.8	2.9	2.2	2.4	2.4	2.5
Net exports	-0.2	-0.4	-1.1	-1.7	-1.1	-0.3	-0.3	-0.2	0.4	-1.0	-0.2	-0.1	-0.1	-0.6
Inventories	0.1	0.2	-0.7	1.2	0.6	0.1	0.0	0.0	-0.2	0.3	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	0.2
Income and profits (NIPA basis)														
Adjusted corp profits	26.3	7.0	41.5	9.2	10.1	7.2	6.3	6.6	6.4	16.2	6.3	0.0	0.0	9.4
Real disposable personal income	-0.9	0.9	-1.5	2.9	0.3	1.7	1.7	1.3	1.0	0.7	1.6	0.0	0.0	1.3
Nominal disposable personal income	2.0	5.5	3.8	5.3	3.9	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.9	4.6	3.8	2.6	3.7	4.0
Saving rate ¹	3.8	3.9	2.8	2.7	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.2	-	-	-	4.6	2.9	2.2
Prices and labor cost														
Consumer price index	2.5	3.6	6.1	1.5	4.1	1.3	1.7	2.3	2.7	3.8	1.7	2.7	3.4	2.3
Core	2.0	2.8	2.9	2.1	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.9	2.6	2.5
PCE deflator	2.9	4.6	5.3	2.4	3.6	2.1	2.2	2.5	2.8	4.0	2.2	2.6	3.7	2.7
Core	2.7	4.4	3.6	2.8	2.9	2.8	2.6	2.7	2.9	3.4	2.7	2.8	3.3	2.8
GDP chain-type price index	3.7	3.6	6.4	2.4	3.6	2.1	2.2	2.5	3.3	4.0	2.2	2.8	3.9	2.7
S&P/C-S house price index (%oya)	1.3	0.8	1.2	0.0	0.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	1.3	0.0	3.0	2.2	0.5	3.0
Employment Cost Index	3.0	3.7	3.6	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.3	3.5	3.4	3.2
Productivity	1.6	0.8	1.4	2.4	1.3	1.7	2.0	1.6	2.5	1.5	1.7	2.3	2.0	1.7
Other indicators														
Housing starts (mn units, saar) ¹	1.323	1.418	1.337	1.313	1.350	1.350	1.400	1.400	-	-	-	1.371	1.356	1.388
Industrial production, mfg.	-3.6	1.7	5.2	1.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.3	2.4	1.0	-1.0	0.9	1.4
Light vehicle sales (mn units, saar) ¹	15.7	15.5	16.4	15.5	15.5	15.8	15.8	15.8	-	-	-	16.2	15.7	15.8
Unemployment rate ¹	4.5	4.3	4.3	4.1	4.1	4.0	4.0	4.0	-	-	-	4.4	4.5	4.0
Payroll employment (ch, '000s, samr) ¹	-30	43	96	95	100	100	50	50	-	-	-	0	0	63
Nominal GDP	4.2	5.8	8.0	6.0	5.5	4.4	4.5	4.3	5.4	6.3	4.3	5.0	6.2	5.0
Current account balance (\$bn) ¹	-221	-227	-259	-268	-277	-287	-287	-287	-	-	-	-1177	-1031	-1149
% of GDP	-2.8	-2.8	-3.2	-3.3	-3.3	-3.4	-3.4	-3.3	-	-	-	-3.8	-3.2	-3.3
Federal budget balance (\$bn) ¹	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-1775	-2020	-1960
% of GDP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-5.8	-6.3	-5.8

¹ Entries are average level for the period. Federal balance figures are for fiscal years.

	Sep 25	4Q26	1Q27	2Q27	3Q27	4Q27
Interest rate forecast (end of period)						
Fed funds target (top of range)	4.00	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25
2-yr Treasury	4.86	4.70	4.65	4.60	4.55	
5-yr Treasury	5.00	4.90	4.95	4.90	4.85	
10-yr Treasury	5.18	5.05	5.10	5.05	5.00	
30-yr Treasury	5.50	5.45	5.50	5.45	5.45	

Source: J.P. Morgan

US economic calendar

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
28 Sep Dallas Fed manufacturing (10:30am) Sep Fed Vice Chair Bowman speaks(8:15am) Fed Governor Cook speaks(1:25pm) Richmond Fed President Barkin speaks(1:30pm)	29 Sep FHFA HPI (9:00am) Jul S&P/Case-Shiller HPI (9:00am) Jul JOLTS (10:00am) Aug <u>7.4mm</u> Consumer confidence (10:00am) Sep <u>89.0</u> Fed Vice Chair Bowman speaks(11:00am) Fed Governor Barr speaks(12:40pm) Chicago Fed President Goolsbee speaks(1:00pm) New York Fed President Williams speaks(2:00pm)	30 Sep ADP employment (8:15am) Sep Advance economic indicators (8:30am) Aug <u>-\$121bn</u> Real GDP (8:30am) 2Q final <u>1.7%</u> Personal income (8:30am) Aug <u>0.5%</u> Real consumption <u>0.7%</u> Core PCE deflator <u>0.25%</u> (3.3%) Richmond Fed President Barkin speaks(1:30pm) Fed Governor Cook speaks(3:25pm) Chicago Fed President Goolsbee speaks(5:10pm) Minneapolis Fed President Kashkari speaks(6:00pm)	1 Oct Initial claims (8:30am) w/e Sep 26 <u>205,000</u> Manufacturing PMI (9:45am) Sep final <u>56.0</u> ISM manufacturing (10:00am) Sep <u>54.5</u> Construction spending (10:00am) Aug <u>0.1%</u> Light vehicle sales Sep <u>16.0mm</u> Announce 10-year note (r) <u>\$39bn</u> Announce 30-year bond (r) <u>\$22bn</u> Announce 3-year note <u>\$58bn</u> Boston Fed President Collins and Richmond Fed President Barkin and Kansas City Fed President Schmid speak(9:05am) New York Fed President Williams and Fed Governor Cook speak(3:30pm) Dallas Fed President Logan speaks(6:45pm)	2 Oct Employment (8:30am) Sep <u>100,000</u> Unemployment rate <u>4.1%</u> Average weekly hours <u>34.4</u> Average hourly earnings <u>0.2%</u> Durable goods (10:00am) Aug Factory orders (10:00am) Aug
5 Oct Services PMI (9:45am) Sep final ISM services (10:00am) Sep	6 Oct International trade (8:30am) Aug Auction 3-year note <u>\$58bn</u> New York Fed President Williams speaks(9:05am) Dallas Fed President Logan speaks(7:00pm)	7 Oct Consumer credit (3:00pm) Aug Auction 10-year note (r) <u>\$39bn</u> FOMC minutes (2:00pm)	8 Oct Initial claims (8:30am) w/e Oct 3 Wholesale trade (10:00am) Aug Auction 30-year bond (r) <u>\$22bn</u>	9 Oct Consumer sentiment (10:00am) Oct preliminary
12 Oct Cleveland Fed President Hammack speaks(12:10pm) Columbus Day, Bond market closed	13 Oct NFIB survey (6:00am) Sep Existing home sales (10:00am) Sep Federal budget (2:00pm) Sep	14 Oct CPI (8:30am) Sep Beige book (2:00pm)	15 Oct PPI (8:30am) Sep Retail sales (8:30am) Sep Initial claims (8:30am) w/e Oct 10 Philadelphia Fed manufacturing (8:30am) Oct Business inventories (10:00am) Aug Announce 5-year TIPS <u>\$26bn</u> Announce 20-year bond (r) <u>\$13bn</u>	16 Oct Import prices (8:30am) Sep Business leaders survey (8:30am) Oct Industrial production (9:15am) Sep TIC data (4:00pm) Aug
19 Oct NAHB survey (10:00am) Oct	20 Oct Housing starts (8:30am) Sep Pending home sales (10:00am) Sep	21 Oct Auction 20-year bond (r) <u>\$13bn</u>	22 Oct Initial claims (8:30am) w/e Oct 17 Leading indicators (10:00am) Sep KC Fed survey (11:00am) Oct Auction 5-year TIPS <u>\$26bn</u>	23 Oct Manufacturing PMI (9:45am) Oct flash Services PMI (9:45am) Oct flash Consumer sentiment (10:00am) Oct final

Source: Private and public agencies and J.P. Morgan. Further details available upon request.

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